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THE ROLE OF POWER AND POLITICS IN THE REPRICING OF
EXECUTIVE OPTIONS
TIMOTHY G. POLLOCK
University of Maryland
HARALD M. FISCHER
JAMES B. WADE
University of Wisconsin—Madison
We explore how CEO power aiiects the repricing of executive options. The spread
between an option's exercise, or strike, price, and the market value of a stock impacts
the likelihood of repricing. This effect is enhanced when Xixe CSO of the firm in
question is also the chairman of its board. Firm and CEO visibility, more board
members appointed after a CEO's hiring than before it, a stagpred board, and rela-
tively high percentages of CEO and institutional ownership reduce the impact of the
spread on the likelihood of repricing.
For years, agency theorists have argued that the use
of long-term compensation tools such as stock op-
tions are effective mechanisms for aligning manage-
ment's interests with those of shareholders (e.g.,
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The
alignment of managerial and shareholder interests is
achieved hy tying a significant portion of an execu-
tive's compensation to the market performance of the
stock of his or her employer. Long-term incentive
plans have proliferated over the last 20 years as
agency arguments regarding incentive compensation
have increased in popularity, hecoming the "domi-
nant logic" in executive compensation.
Although a numher of puhlications have ex-
plored the role of stock options in incentive com-
pensation (see Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman [1997] and
Murphy [1998] for reviews of the literature in this
area), relatively few studies have examined issues
such as how, when, and why stock options get
repriced (e.g., Brenner, Sundaram, & Yermack,
2000; Carter & Lynch, 2001; Chance, Kumar &
Todd, 2000). Option repricing occurs when a hoard
of directors elects to either adjust the exercise price
(also known as the strike price) of an executive's
existing options downward, or to cancel an execu-
tive's existing options and grant him or her new
options with a lower strike price. Although compa-
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nies argue that option repricing ultimately henefits
shareholders (Chance et al., 2000), investors gener-
ally view repricing negatively and consider it to he
"rewarding failure" (Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998).
The purpose of this study was to develop a
framework for understanding why some companies
reprice options while others do not. Since option
repricing can he considered a hreakdown in the
agency relationship (Chance et al., 2000), we
moved heyond traditional agency explanations and
explored how CEO power, the power of outside
stockholders, and the visibility of a company and
its CEO enhance or reduce the likelihood that op-
tion repricing will occur. In this study, we pursued
a finer-grained approach than has previous re-
search, which has typically relied on analyses over
annual intervals (e.g., Brenner et al,, 2000; Carter &
Lynch, 2001; Chance et al., 2000). Instead, we used
monthly observations examining how the power of
a CEO interacts with the difference between the
average strike price of options and the current mar-
ket price of its stock (what we hereafter refer to as
the "negative spread") to impact the decision to
reprice.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Option repricing generally occurs after a sharp
decline in the stock price of a company that has
placed the current market value of the company's
stock below the strike price of executives' options
(making their options "out of the money" or "un-
derwater"). External market forces beyond the con-
trol of management are often blamed for these pre-
cipitous drops, and repricing is commonly justified
by the need to retain and motivate a current man-
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agement team. However, as the business press has
reported, option repricing often occurs over howls
of protest from shareholders who have also suffered
financial losses from the drop in stock price [e.g.,
Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998). Indeed, these strong,
negative reactions from shareholders have led
Patrick McGurn, the director of corporate programs
for the proxy advisory service Institutional Share-
holder Services, Inc., to conclude that option re-
pricing has become "the preeminent concern on the
compensation front for shareholders" (Martinez,
1998). Because of the negative publicity that option
repricing generates, and the repercussions it can
have for a company and the legitimacy of its claims
regarding other compensation practices, repricing
offers an ideal opportunity to explore how the
power of key stakeholders and the CEO influence
whether or not a company takes actions that can
have these potentially damaging results.
Although agency-theoretic arguments such as the
realignment of management's interests with those
of shareholders are often used to justify decisions
to reprice options, the resistance of stockholders to
repricing (e.g., Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998) sug-
gests that option repricing nonetheless represents a
breakdown in tbe agency relationship between
managers and stockholders (Brenner et al., 2000;
Chance et al., 2000). Prior research has shown no
empirical support for claims that industry condi-
tions beyond tbe control of management (Brenner
et al., 2000; Chance et al., 2000; Carter & Lyncb,
2001), or being in an industry where management
is in high demand (Brenner et al., 2000], drive
repricing. In addition, tbe findings of Cbance and
colleagues call into question tbe frequent claims of
tbe boards of repricing firms tbat their option
grants cannot motivate and/or retain employees at
their current strike prices. Cbance and bis col-
leagues found tbat repriced options averaged 5.5
years until expiration and that balf of tbe repriced
options would have been "in tbe money" witbin 19
months bad tbey not been repriced. Alternative
tbeoretical explanations may provide a better un-
derstanding of wbat factors influence decisions to
reprice executive options.
Option Strike Price and Market Price Spread
Recent research (e.g., Sanders, 2001; Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998) bas suggested tbat executives
will make different decisions depending on
wbetber or not tbeir incentive compensation is in a
loss position. Drawing on prospect tbeory (Kabne-
man & Tversky, 1979; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995),
scboleirs bave argued tbat executives facing real
losses will make riskier decisions tban executives
in a position to gain, or in neutral positions. They
bave also argued tbat contextual factors can impact
tbe framing of decisions and evaluation of risks.
For example, Sanders (2001) argued and found tbat
poor firm performance created a "negative frame,"
minimizing risk perceptions and increasing risky
bebaviors wben CEOs bad larger amounts of stock
option pay.
In tbe context of stock option repricing, tbe dif-
ference between the strike price of executives' op-
tions and the market price of a stock is an important
contextual factor tbat can impact decision framing
and perceptions of risk (Carter & Lyncb, 2001).
Altbougb, as Sanders pointed out, executives do
not suffer real economic losses wben tbeir stock
price declines, tbey may still perceive a loss as
baving occurred (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
Tbe greater tbe negative spread tbat bas resulted
from a fall in tbe price of a stock, tbe greater the
perceived loss, and tbe lower tbe probability that
tbe market value of tbe stock will exceed tbe strike
price of tbe option before it expires. Tbis cbange in
spread may reduce tbe concern of botb tbe firm's
CEO and its board about the negative ramifications
of repricing for tbe firm, a reduction tbat increases
tbe likelibood tbat tbe board will act in tbe CEO's
interests and reprice bis or ber options.
Hypothesis 1. The greater the negative spread
(defined as the strike price of a CEO's options
minus the market value of a stock), the more
likely the options are to be repriced.
Altbough cbange in spread is likely tbe primary
driver of whether or not options are repriced, tbe
power of a CEO and key stakebolders can be ex-
pected to moderate its influence on tbe likelibood
of a repricing event. We focus on tbe moderating
effects rather tban on tbe direct, main effects of
tbese factors in developing our arguments because
tbere is no real incentive to reprice options if per-
formance is bigb and all options are in tbe money.
Tbus, a negative spread is a necessary contextual
condition for tbese factors to be effective.
Ownership Sources of Power
Finkelstein stated tbe following: "Power accrues
to managers in tbeir capacity as agents acting on
behalf of sbarebolders. Hence, tbe strengtb of a
manager's position in tbe agent-principal relation-
sbip determines ownersbip power" (1992; 509).
Ownersbip power tbus depends on tbe concentra-
tion of stock botb in tbe bands of interested and
active outsider sbarebolders and in tbe bands of tbe
CEO of a firm bim- or berself (Tosi et al., 1999).
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Institutional stock ownership. Recent research
has suggested that institutional investors are be-
coming an increasingly important group of share-
holders who have the potential to check self-
promoting behavior on the part of management
(David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Useem, 1996).
According to these arguments, institutions are
more likely than individual investors to engage in
proactive behavior for three principal reasons: it is
more difficult for institutions to exit (to sell hold-
ings) without significantly depressing the price of
the stock (David & Kochar, 1996); institutions enjoy
greater economies of scale in monitoring compen-
sation policy than do individuals (Black, 1992);
and institutions have more ability to act collec-
tively (Davis & Thompson, 1994). Support has been
found for the proposition that both high- and low-
ownership institutional investors can mitigate the
power of executives and can influence compensa-
tion policies (Useem, 1996; Wahal, 1996). Anec-
dotal evidence is consistent with theoretical expec-
tations that institutional investors generally react
negatively and will oppose executive option repric-
ing (e.g., Byrne, 1998; Martinez, 1998). For exam-
ple, Martinez noted that the State of Wisconsin
Investment Board claimed it had persuaded 16
companies in which it held stakes to adopt a policy
requiring shareholder approval of any future
repricings.
Finally, it is also possible that institutional in-
vestors may not even have to actively exercise their
power to have a significant impact on repricing
decisions. As managers become more sensitive to
the reactions of institutional owners, concerns vis-
a-vis these important constituents may lead to a
decrease in the probability that a company will
decide to take actions that outsiders may perceive
negatively (Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999; Wade,
Porac, & Pollock, 1997)—in this case, repricing ex-
ecutives' options. Given the preceding arguments,
it is reasonable to assume that stock ownership by
institutional investors may dampen the effect of
spread on option repricing.
Hypothesis 2. Institutional stock ownership
will interact with negative spread to decrease
the likelihood of option repricing.
CEO stock ownership. Much of the research
in the agency tradition focusing on the owner-
ship structure of firms has distinguished between
"owner-controlled" firms, in which single outside
shareholders own 5 percent or more of the voting
shares, and "management-controlled" firms, in
which no single major outside shareholders exist
(Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Current theoriz-
ing suggests a third category—"owner-managed"
firms—in which insiders own 5 percent or more of
the companies' stock (Tosi et al., 1999). Strong
support has been found for an inverse relation be-
tween CEO ownership concentration and manage-
rial self-serving behavior. Murphy suggested that
the "natural measure of CEO incentives and [indi-
cator of] the severity of the agency problem is the
percentage ownership [of the CEO]" (1998: 32). In
terms of conflicts of interest between managers and
shareholders. Murphy reported that increases in
the percentage of direct CEO ownership (with dol-
lar ownership held constant) reduced agency prob-
lems related to perquisite compensation and was
the strongest disincentive to managerial self-serv-
ing behavior (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Murphy,
1999). In addition, Sanders (2001) found that CEO
stock ownership was negatively associated with
taking riskier organizational actions. Although op-
tion repricing reduces the individual risk to an
executive, it increases the risk to an organization of
a negative backlash from shareholders and/or the
business press, and thus it can be regarded as a
risky organizational activity. Therefore, like insti-
tutional ownership, CEO stock ownership may
dampen the effect of negative spread on the likeli-
hood of repricing.
Hypothesis 3. CEO stock ownership will inter-
act with negative spread to decrease the likeli-
hood of option repricing.
Structural Sources of CEO Power
Finkelstein noted the following: "Managers who
have a legislative right to exert influence are in-
fluential. Hence, CEOs have high structural power
. . . because of their formal organizational position"
(1992: 506). In addition to a CEO's formal position
or positions (for instance, one individual's serving
as both chief executive and chairman of the board
[Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990; Zajac & West-
phal, 1995]), other organizational structures and
rules protect the CEO from outside influence and
enhance CEO power.
Both agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Weis-
bach, 1988) and the sociopolitical literature on ex-
ecutive compensation and top management teams
(Belliveau, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1996; Main, O'Reilly,
& Wade, 1995) suggest that the composition of a
corporation's board of directors has important im-
plications for its CEO's power. Recent research has
shown that the ability of a CEO to nominate board
members, both insiders and outsiders, can signifi-
cantly enhance the CEO's power by allowing him
or her to select board members who will be loyal, as
well as by increasing the directors' dependence on
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the CEO for their board seats (Belliveau et al , 1996;
Wade et al, 1990; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). This
evidence is consistent with that of previous re-
search (e.g., Brenner et al., 2000) indicating that the
presence on a board's compensation committee of a
director who also has a dependent relationship with
the organization (that is, the director provides legal,
consulting, or other services to the firm that could
compromise his or her independence) is positively
associated with the repricing of stock options.
Putting in place barriers to prevent hostile take-
overs can also enhance a CEO's power by reducing
the effectiveness of the market for corporate control
and enhancing his or her ability to engage in other
unpopular activities, such as repricing executive
options (e.g., Sundaramurthy, Rechner, & Wang,
1996; Weston, Chung, & Siu, 1998). Staggered elec-
tions of board members, poison pills, and the cre-
ation and use of employee stock option plans have
all heen used to reduce the likelihood of a hostile
takeover that could result in the ousting of a current
management team (Weston et al., 1998), even if the
takeover would be in the best financial interests of
the stockholders.
A CEO's structural power is expected to affect the
likelihood of whether option packages are consid-
ered for lepricing. As Finkelstein (1992) noted, the
sources and exercise of power are context-specific.
Thus, appropriate conditions must exist for CEO
power to impact the decision to reprice. Holding
underwater options creates such a condition for a
CEO. In this context, we would expect CEO struc-
tural power to moderate the effect of negative
spread in such a way as to increase the chances of
the occurrence of such an event. The following
hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 4. CEO structural power will inter-
act with negative spread to increase the likeli-
hood of option repricing.
Visibility
Given that repricing is likely to generate a great
deal of negative sentiment among shareholders, the
visibility of the action may create concerns for com-
panies considering repricing executive options.
Boards may he less likely to engage in self-serving
behaviors on their CEOs' behalf if they feel these
actions are likely to be observed and discussed
publicly. Research has shown that high visibility
increases a firm's susceptibility to influence from
outside constituents (e.g., Edelman, 1990, 1992).
Two factors that may increase the visihility of the
repricing event are the size of the firm and the
amount of compensation the CEO receives.
Edelman (1990, 1992) argued that, because of
their high visibility, large firms felt pressure to
adopt formal grievance procedures, even though
existing laws did not specifically require them to
do so. Mishina, Pollock, Porac, Rao, and Wade
(2000) found that large firms are more likely to he
the targets of shareholder activists proposing cor-
porate governance resolutions. Large firms are also
more likely than small organizations to he evalu-
ated by industry observers and to be discussed in
the business press (Bhushan, 1989). Two previous
repricing studies have shown firm size to be nega-
tively associated with the likelihood of repricing
(Brennei et al., 2000; Chance et al., 2000). Although
neither of these studies provides an ex ante theo-
retical explanation for why smaller firms are more
likely to reprice than larger firms. Chance and col-
leagues (2000) speculated that this finding was a
result of the visibility of larger firms and the
amount of attention the business press gives to
repricing.
CEO compensation can also draw attention to a
firm and enhance the threat associated with the
decision to reprice executives' options (e.g., Porac
et al., 1999; Wade et al., 1997). Popular business
periodicals such as BusinessWeek and Fortune
publish annual reports highlighting the compensa-
tion packages of the highest-paid CEOs, and com-
pensation consultants have decried the astronomi-
cal levels of CEO pay (e.g.. Crystal, 1991). In the
academic literature, higher levels of CEO annual
and long-term compensation have been associated
with more frequent discussions of both external
validations of CEO pay and the performance mea-
sures used to calculate bonuses when justifying
executive compensation (Wade et al., 1997). CEO
pay has also been associated with firms' making
strong efforts to obfuscate performance compari-
sons by including companies outside their primary
industries in their self-reported industry peer
groups (Porac et al , 1999). A CEO's current com-
pensation, and the degree to which repricing his or
her options may be perceived as excessive, could
therefore be expected to moderate the effect of
spread and infiuence the likelihood that a repricing
event will occur.
Hypothesis 5. CEO and firm visibility will in-
teract with negative spread to decrease the
likelihood of option repricing.
METHODS
Sample
We examined repricing events that occurred dur-
ing the latter six months of 1998, taking that period
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as a natural experimental setting. During tbis pe-
riod, tbe market as a wbole suffered a significant
downturn and a subsequent recovery. Tbe brief but
intense decline in tbe overall market enbanced
conditions for observing option repricing. Indeed, a
number of option-repricing events were reported
during tbis time (e.g., Jobnston, 1998).
To examine tbe determinants of stock option re-
pricing we selected a single industry—computer
software—wbere options have become an impor-
tant component of executive compensation pack-
ages (Carter & Lyncb, 2001). By selecting a single
industry, we were able to rule out cross-industry
variations, including differential effects in compen-
sation practices. Tbe original sample included 391
publicly traded software companies listed in tbe
COMPUSTAT database at tbe end of 1997. Owing
to difficulties associated witb tbe timing of repric-
ing events and fiscal year reports, we restricted our
analyses to firms wbose fiscal year-ends were be-
tween January and June. We also dropped from tbe
sample foreign firms, firms wbose CEOs beld no
options, and firms tbat went bankrupt, merged,
were acquired by anotber firm during 1998, or con-
ducted an initial public offering within one year of
tbe period under study (tbereby limiting tbe avail-
ability of necessary lagged data). Tbe resulting sam-
ple contained 150 companies. Missing data re-
duced our final sample to 136 firms and 799 firm-
montb observations. Tbe results of f-tests revealed
no differences between our final and original sam-
ples in terms of sales, net income, number of em-
ployees, or total sbares outstanding. Compensation
data and information on CEOs and boards of direc-
tors were drawn from firms' 1999 and 1998 proxy
statements. Company financial data were obtained
from COMPUSTAT. Montbly stock price and mar-
ket performance data were obtained from tbe CRSP
database. Institutional and CEO ownersbip data
were obtained from Compact Disclosure.
Variables and Analysis
Dependent variable. Tbe dependent variable in
tbe study was wbetber or not an option-repricing
event occurred during a montbly spell between July
and December 1998. A repricing event was coded
as baving occurred if any prior option grant offered
to a firm's CEO was reported as being repriced
during tbe last six montbs of 1998.
Independent variables. Tbe negative spread be-
tween tbe average strike price of a CEO's options
and tbe current market price of tbe corporation
employing tbe CEO was assessed montbly. We sub-
tracted tbe market price of tbe firm's stock at tbe
beginning of eacb montb from tbe weigbted average
strike price of all tbe CEO's option grants. Tbus.
positive values for tbis measure indicate tbe degree
to wbicb a CEO's options are underwater. Tbe
strike price of eacb option grant was weigbted by
the number of options associated witb tbe grant.
Tbe weigbted. average of all grants was used be-
cause it is impossible to accurately assess wbicb
options, if any, will be repriced until tbe event
occurs. Using tbe weigbted average also belped
adjust for tbe impact of tbe size and strike price
differentials of tbe various grants. Because a
weigbted average of all grants was used, it was
possible for tbe spread based on tbe overall average
to be in tbe money even if one or more grants were
substantially underwater.
Institutional ownership and CEO ownership were
measured as tbe percentage of outstanding voting
sbares owned collectively by all institutions and by
a firm's CEO, respectively, at tbe beginning of tbe
period of study.
Tbree variables were used to measure CEO struc-
tural power. CEO duality was a dummy variable
indicating wbetber or not a firm's CEO was also tbe
cbairman of its board. CEO duality is a commonly
used measure of CEO power (Wade et al., 1990).
Tbe number of board members appointed after the
CEO indicates a CEO's potential to capture and
consolidate power over tbe board (Wade et al..
1990; Westpbal & Zajac, 1998). Finally, a dummy
variable indicating wbetber or not a company bad a
staggered board was also included as an indicator
of CEO power. Classifying directors into different
groups, as is done in some firms, and staggering tbe
elections of tbe classes so tbat only a minority of a
board can be voted out in any one year makes it
more difficult to take over a company and oust its
CEO (Sundaramurtby et al., 1996).
Visibility was assessed as tbe net sales of a firm
in fiscal 1997 plus tbe total cash compensation
(1998 base salary + 1997 annual bonus) of tbe CEO.
Tbe use of sales as a proxy for firm size is well
establisbed in tbe literature, was appropriate for
tbe industry of interest bere. and is consistent witb
prior researcb on repricing (e.g., Brenner at al..
2000).
Control variables. We included tbe total value of
the option package at risk of being repriced at tbe
beginning of tbe time period to control for tbe mag-
nitude of tbe potential loss to tbe CEO. Tbis mea-
sure was defined as tbe sum of tbe market price at
tbe beginning of tbe study period minus tbe strike
price of eacb grant multiplied by tbe number of
sbares underlying tbe options in tbat grant. Option
grants tbat were underwater at tbe beginning of tbe
study were assigned a value of zero. Altbougb we
recognize tbat options bave a tbeoretical nonzero
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valuation up to the point of expiration (based on
use of the Black-Scholes or similar option valuation
techniques), this simple calculation is more likely
to reflect the valuation an executive will consider
when determining how much money he or she may
have "lost" owing to a decline in stock price.
We also included a monthly market performance
measure hased on changes in the NASDAQ com-
posite index to control for changes in general mar-
ket conditions. Board size was included as a con-
trol hecause the size of a hoard can influence the
number of hoard memhers appointed after a CEO
enters office.
We converted the total value of the option pack-
age at risk, institutional ownership, cash compen-
sation, and sales to natural logarithms to reduce the
effects of extreme values of these measures on the
analyses. Since some companies had zero sales
and/or institutional ownership, we added a value
of one to these variables for all observations before
logging.
Method of analysis. We modeled option repric-
ing using discrete time event history techniques,
which estimate logit models of dichotomous out-
comes for pooled time series data in which the
same units are observed at multiple intervals (Alli-
son, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). Covariates are al-
lowed, but not required, to vary hetween time
periods. Since the data contained multiple ohser-
vations of the same CEO that are not independent
across spells, we employed the cluster command
using the Stata 6.0 statistical software package,
which provides a conservative test of the hypothe-
ses hy using robust estimators of variance.
RESULTS
Tahle 1 summarizes the characteristics of re-
priced options. The average decline in stock price
between June 1 and the month hefore a repricing
event occurred was 46.7 percent; 53 percent of
companies repricing options pointed to market
factors in explaining this drop. However, the
NASDAQ was up an average of 2.2 percent at the
time firms repriced. This observation is consistent
with prior research (Brenner et al., 2001; Chance et
al., 2000) showing little systematic relationship he-
tween market conditions and stock price declines
for companies that reprice.
CEOs who had their options repriced had their
strike prices decreased hy 50 percent on the aver-
age. In our sample, 82 percent of the companies
claimed repricing was necessary to retain key per-
sonnel, and 65 percent of the companies suggested
repricing was necessary to motivate employees and
realign their interests with those of shareholders.
Approximately 79 percent of the repriced options
were hack in the money hy the end of 1999, on the
hasis of the new strike prices. However, 64 percent
of the CEOs would have heen hack in the money hy
TABLE 1
Characteristics of Repriced Options
characteristic Mean Median s.d. Minimum Maximum
Percent change in stock prior to repricing"
Percent change in NASDAQ prior to repricing^
Percent change in total value of options'"
Percent change in strike price at repricing''
With repricing
Percentage of CEOs at or in the money, end of
Percentage of CEOs at or in the money, end of
1999''
Value of repriced options, end of 1998
Value of repriced options, end of 1999
Without repricing
Percentage of CEOs at or in the money, end of
1998''
Percentage of CEOs at or in the money, end of
1999'*
Value of repriced options, end of 1998
Value of repriced options, end of 1999
-46.7
2.2
-63.3
-49.9
-47.2
-0.4
-35.1
-47.2
25.2
6.5
42.4
16.6
-4.0
-7.8
0
-24.8
-81.8
13.4
-100
-84.3
71
79
$942,737
$3,133,799
18
64
$388,400
$2,166,995
$59,175
$1,065,124
$0
$845,403
$2,157,342
$3,615,221
$1,457,803
$2,925,609
$0
$0
$0
$0
$8,643,900
$10,575,000
$6,206,400
$8,137,500
" These are percent changes relative to June 1, 1998.
'' Compared to strike price at time of grant or prior repricing. Underwater options were valued at zero.
'Based on 17 CEOs.
'' Based on 14 CEOs; three firms were acquired or went bankrupt in 1999.
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tbe end of 1999 bad tbeir options not been repriced.
Repricing increased tbe mean value of tbe CEOs'
options at tbe end of 1998 by an average of
$554,000, altbougb tbis effect appears to bave been
driven by tbe outsized $8.4 million gain of one
CEO. Tbe median increase was a more modest
$59,175. By tbe end of 1999, bowever, tbe median
increase due to repricing was over $200,000, and
tbe mean increase was nearly $1,000,000.
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix and de-
scriptive statistics for all tbe variables used in tbe
models reported. Table 3 presents tbe results of tbe
logistic regression analyses testing our bypotbeses.
Tbe negative spread, or difference between tbe av-
erage option strike price and tbe market price of a
stock, is positively and significantly related to re-
pricing in four of tbe five models. Since positive
values indicate tbe degree to wbicb a CEO's options
are underwater, Hypotbesis 1 is supported. By mul-
tiplying a given coefficient by a cbange in tbe in-
dependent variable and tben exponentiating it, we
obtained tbe cbange in tbe odds of an event's oc-
curring or not occurring. Tbe effect of negative
spread is relatively strong; for example, tbe in-
crease in odds tbat results from a $5 increase in
negative spread is exp(.121 X 5) = 1.83.
Tbe results reported under model 2 support Hy-
potbeses 2 and 3, stating tbat institutional and CEO
ownersbip will reduce tbe effect of a negative
spread on tbe likelibood of repricing. Tbe interac-
tive effects of botb institutional ownersbip and
CEO ownersbip on spread are negative and signif-
icant. Indeed, if tbe negative spread is $5 and tbe
level of institutional ownersbip doubles, tbe effect
on tbe odds of repricing decreases by a factor of
two. Tbese effects remain robust in tbe saturated
model. Models 2 and 5 also exhibit significant im-
provement in fit over tbe "main effects" model at
tbe .05 level.
Model 3 is a test of Hypotbesis 4, wbicb predicts
tbat CEO structural power will bave a positive
moderating effect on negative spread and will en-
bance tbe probability of repricing. CEO duality bas
tbe predicted positive and significant moderating
effect. If a negative spread is $5, and tbe CEO of tbe
firm in question is also tbe cbairman of its board,
tbe impact of tbe negative spread is increased by a
factor of 1.7. We also found tbat tbe number of
board members appointed after a CEO took office
bas a significant moderating effect, but its direction
is tbe opposite of tbat predicted by Hypotbesis 4.
Tbe staggered board interaction is not significant in
model 3. In tbe saturated models duality continues
to bave a positive and significant effect; tbe vari-
able for board members appointed after tbe CEO is
no longer significant; and staggered board bas a
significant, negative, moderating effect. Tbus, Hy-
potbesis 4 is only partially supported.
Model 4 tests Hypotbesis 5, tbat firm and CEO
visibility will negatively impact tbe effect of spread
on option repricing. Neitber sales nor CEO casb
compensation are significant in tbis model. How-
ever, tbe moderating effect of total casb compensa-
tion is negative and significant in tbe saturated
model. In addition. Table 2 indicates tbat sales and
CEO casb compensation are correlated at .75; tbus,
collinearity may be masking potentially significant
results. Wben total casb compensation was not in-
cluded in models 4 and 5, tbe moderating effect of
sales was negative and significant [p < .05), as
predicted in Hypotbesis 5. Similar results were
found for total casb compensation wben sales was
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations'*
Variable
1. Repricing event
2. Negative spread
3. Market performance
4. Institutional ownership''
5. CEO ownership
6. CEO duality
7. Board members appointed after
CEO
8. Staggered board
9. Net sales'"
10. CEO cash compensation''
11. Value of option package at
risk''
12. Board size
Mean
-6.25
2.25
3.00
7.82
0.56
2.90
0.51
3.80
12.74
12.16
6.16
S.d.
12.77
6.67
1.36
10.39
0.50
2.10
0.50
1.53
0.66
5.59
1.45
1
.10
-.00
.01
-.06
-.05
-.09
-.02
-.01
.03
-.06
-.02
2
-.11
-.24
-.04
.01
- .25
.03
-.30
-.25
-.49
-.16
3
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
4
-.29
.10
.14
.11
.49
.32
.21
.05
5
.33
.36
.07
-.16
-.14
-.15
.01
6
.31
.15
.11
.16
-.08
.09
7
.03
.17
.24
.09
.51
8
.02
-.07
-.02
.13
9
.75
.29
.21
10
.25
.29
11
.03
" Correlations greater than .12 are significant at p < .001; r's greater than .08 are significant at p < .01; r's > .07 are significant at p < .05.
'' Logarithm.
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TABLE 3
Results of Discrete Time Event History Analysis*
Explanatory Variable
Negative spread
Institutional ownership''
CEO ownership
CEO duality
Board members appointed after CEO
Staggered board
Sales"
Cash compensation''
Amount at risk''
Market performance
Board size
Institutional ownership x spread
CEO ownership X spread
CEO duality x spread
Board members appointed after CEO X spread
Staggered board X spread
Sales X spread
Cash compensation X spread
Constant
Log-likelihood
Model 1
0.12**(0.04)
0.16
-0.04
-0.60
-0.22
-0.26
-0.38
0.88'^
0.00
0.01
0.10
-13.58*
-73.74
(0.27)
(0.05)
(0.71)
(0.16)
(0.55)
(0.25)
(0.55)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.17)
(6.84)
Model
1.02***
0.26
-0.04
-0.60
-0.24
-0.12
-0.45^
1.01*
0.04
0.02
0.02
-0.21**
-0.01**'
-15.39**
-70.23
2
(0.30)
(0.31)
(0.04)
(0.67)
(0.17)
(0.55)
(0.27)
(0.49)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.19)
(0.07)
(0.00)
(5.86)
Model 3
0.19**(0.06)
0.03
-0 .06
-0 .70
-0 .15
-0 .18
-0 .34
0.58
0.03
0.01
0.06
O.IO'^
-0 .02*
-0 .05
-9 .69
-71.73
(0.29)
(0.06)
(0.63)
(0.18)
(0.58)
(0.27)
(0.63)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.18)
(0.05)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(7.70)
Model 4
0.15 (0.47)
0.16 (0.28)
-0.04 (0.05)
-0.61 (0.71)
-0.23 (0.16)
-0.21 (0.54)
-0.35 (0.24)
0.76 (0.56)
0.01 (0.04)
0.01 (0.03)
0.13 (0.17)
-0.04 (0.03)
0.01 (0.04)
-12.39^(6.83)
-73.16
Model
2.49***
0.18
-0.03
-1.29
-0.25
0.00
-0.37
0.96^
0.09^
0.03
-0.03
-0.20***
-0.01***
0.33***
0.00
-0.07^
-0.01
-0.11*
-15.01*
-66.01
5
(0.59)
(0.33)
(0.05)
(0.82)
(0.19)
(0.58)
(0.31)
(0.57)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.19)
(0.06)
(0.00)
(0.07)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.05)
(6.77)
" Values in parentheses are standard errors.
'' Logarithm.
"^ p < .10
* p < .05
**p < .01
*** p < .001
excluded from the saturated model, although the
moderating effect of compensation was still not
significant in model 4. Hypothesis 5 is thus at least
partially supported.
DISCUSSION
In this study we have hegun to explore how CEO
and stakeholder power impact organizational
actions that can have potentially negative con-
sequences for a firm. Our findings provide the
opportunity to extend theories in executive com-
pensation beyond the traditional agency theory
framework (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and
they provide some insights into an important phe-
nomenon that so far has not received much atten-
tion in the management literature.
Our findings support the perhaps unsurprising
contention that the degree to which a CEO's stock
options are underwater is a primary driver of the
decision whether or not to reprice. Of more interest
is the fact that a numher of political factors interact
with this primary driver to enhance or retard its
effect on repricing. Consistent with previous re-
search on CEO power, having a CEO who is also the
chair of the board enhances the probahility that
stock options will be repriced. An interesting and
unexpected finding was that having more hoard
memhers appointed hy a CEO and having staggered
board elections reduced the impact of spread on the
likelihood of repricing. There is an important dis-
tinction between the roles of these measures and
CEO duality in our findings. Whereas holding both
the CEO and chair positions directly enhanced a
CEO's power, having made a high percentage of
board appointments and having staggered board
elections enhanced the power of a CEO indirectly,
presumably by decreasing the power of the board. It
is possible that when board members consider a
relatively infrequent and visible action that is
likely to he interpreted negatively—such as decid-
ing to reprice options—board members are espe-
cially sensitive about appearing to aid their CEO
and thereby confirm assumptions about their weak-
ness and lack of independence. Such a perception
on the part of external stakeholders could, diminish
the legitimacy of board claims about other issues.
Thus, rather than enhancing CEO power, it is pos-
sible that these factors create impression manage-
ment concerns for a board that may decrease CEO
power.
Ownership power was found to reduce the ef-
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fects of spread on repricing. The finding that the
percentage of common stock owned by institu-
tional investors had a negative, moderating effect is
consistent with previous research that suggests in-
creasingly activist institutional shareholders can
and do attempt to limit executive compensation
(David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Useem, 1996).
Also consistent with previous research (Murphy,
1999), CEO ownership was negatively associated
with repricing. It is possible that this finding re-
sults from the alignment of interests that comes
with direct stock ownership. It is also possible that
CEOs who own a significant proportion of their
companies' stock become more risk averse (Sand-
ers, 2001) and thus less willing to risk the conse-
quences for the firms of repricing. Table 2 reveals a
negative correlation between CEO stock ownership
and total amount at risk. Thus, CEOs with high
levels of stock ownership may also be less con-
cerned with repricing because it represents a
smaller proportion of their total wealth. Finally, it
may also be the case that CEOs with substantial
ownership stakes are less likely to leave their com-
panies because their options are underwater, and
therefore the retention motivation purportedly un-
derlying many repricing decisions is not as urgent.
This study also provided some support for the
expectation that the visibility of a firm and of its
CEO has a negative impact on repricing. If the vis-
ibility of the act and the resulting fallout were not a
concern, then size would not have had a negative,
moderating effect. In fact, we might have ex-
pected to observe a positive interaction with CEO
compensation, on the basis of the argument that
high compensation levels indicate a CEO's ability
to meet self-serving needs.
Our results have potentially significant implica-
tions for agency theory, which provides the logic
for granting stock options, and they are consistent
with the arguments of others (e.g.. Murphy, 1999)
who have suggested that stock options are ineffec-
tive in aligning management and shareholder inter-
ests. Our findings show that powerful CEOs have a
greater ability to change the strike price of their
options, thereby removing the downside threat
faced by stockholders. However, our results also
support the contention that direct CEO ownership,
even though it increases CEO power, also limits
self-serving behavior. It is possible that alignment
can be achieved with relatively small CEO owner-
ship stakes, as long as the holdings represent a
significant portion of a CEO's total wealth. One
implication of this study for practitioners, then, is
that restricted stock awards, which increase a
CEO's direct ownership but prevent the CEO from
selling the stock for a period of time, may be supe-
rior to stock options for achieving incentive align-
ment. Future research might continue to explore
this issue. Finally, our findings support recent
work (e.g., Wiseman & Comez-Mejia, 1998) that
suggests all managers are not uniformly risk averse,
as is traditionally assumed within agency theory.
Rather, contextual factors can influence manage-
ment perceptions of, and willingness to tolerate,
risk. Future research should continue to explore
this issue in other contexts besides compensation,
such as strategic decision making.
Like any study, this one is not without limita-
tions. We focused on a single industry in which
stock options are considered an especially impor-
tant part of the compensation package (Carter &
Lynch, 2001). Although such a focus provides a
number of benefits, it also limits the generalizabil-
ity of our findings. In addition, we restricted the
time frame of our study to a six-month period that
saw extreme market volatility. It is possible a dif-
ferent pattern of results could emerge if repricing
events were examined over a longer period of time.
However, 11.5 percent of the companies in our
sample repriced within a six-month period, provid-
ing us with the necessary conditions to identify and
capture the effects of forces that may have been
more difficult to identify statistically in a longer
and less turbulent period. (For instance, Brenner et
al. [2000] found that only 1.3 percent of the com-
panies in their sample repriced in a given year.) A
final limitation is that we focused only on CEO
option repricing. We were unable to determine
whether or not employees beyond the five highest-
paid individuals also had their options repriced.
However, whenever a CEO's options were repriced
in our sample, at least some if not all of the other
top executives in his or her firm also had their
options repriced. It is unlikely that substantially
different forces were at play when the board de-
cided to reprice their options, although it is possi-
ble that different forces might be at play when a
CEO's options are excluded from a repricing event.
Future research might explore this question.
Additional research could also look more closely
at serial repricers, companies that repeatedly re-
price option grants for executives (Byrne, 1998).
Although previous research has noted the presence
of serial repricers (e.g., Brenner et al., 2000), no
analyses have been conducted that explore how
these firms differ from those that reprice only once
or not at all. Future research might also examine
companies' claims that repricing is necessary to
retain key individuals by exploring the effects of
repricing on executive turnover, as well as by ex-
ploring other organizational ramifications associ-
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ated with repricing, including long-term stock
price performance.
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